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‘‘They forget what they came for’’: Uganda’s army in Sudan 
 
Mareike Schomerus 
 
 
Uganda’s army, the Uganda  People’s Defence Force (UPDF), has been operating 
on Sudanese territory since the late 1990s. From 2002 to 2006, a bilateral agreement 
between the governments  in Khartoum and Kampala gave the Ugandan soldiers 
permission to conduct military operations in Southern  Sudan to eliminate the 
Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Instead of conducting a successful 
operation against  Uganda’s  most  persistent  rebels  - who  had  withdrawn  into 
Sudanese  territory  and acted as a proxy force in Sudan’s civil war - the UPDF 
conducted  a campaign of abuse against Sudanese civilians. Drawing  on extensive 
fieldwork conducted over several years, this article documents local experiences of a 
foreign  army’s  involvement  in  the  brutal  Sudanese  civil war.  It  outlines  why 
continued operations of the UPDF outside their borders recreate the same problem 
they purport to be fighting: abuses of civilians. Since 2008, US military support for 
the  UPDF mission  against  the  LRA  has  called  into  question  the  viability  of 
continued  militarisation through  an army that has committed widely documented 
human  rights abuses. The foreign military  has not  brought  peace to the region. 
Instead, it has made a peaceful environment less likely for residents of South Sudan. 
 
Keywords: UPDF;  LRA;   Uganda;   Sudan;   civilian-military   relations;   army; 
intervention;  Juba  Peace Talks; Kony2012 
 
 
Introduction 
On October  14, 2011, US President  Barack  Obama  announced that  he had  in the 
interest  of US  national  security  and  foreign  policy authorised approximately 100 
military  personnel  including  ‘‘a small number  of combat  equipped  U.S.  forces to 
deploy  to  central  Africa  to  provide  assistance  to  regional  forces that  are working 
toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield’’.1  In March 2012, an 
unprecedented internet  campaign  by the US organisation Invisible Children  used a 
videoclip entitled ‘‘Kony2012’’ to drum up support  for continued  US military 
engagement  in the region  and  assistance  to the Uganda  army.2  Two months  after 
President Obama’s announcement the Ugandan Daily Monitor quoted US Maj. Gen. 
Margaret Woodward as saying that  she was 
 
personally  impressed  with  what  the  UPDF has  done  to  counter  the  LRA  and  their 
tenacity to go after Kony. I think that earns all of our respect because it has been great. 
We just wish we can support  that  fight even more . . . Another  reason  why we need to 
partner  with the UPDF is because they are a very professional  force.3 
Neither President Obama,  the Invisible Children,  nor Major  General  Woodward 
detailed what the deployment  of US military advisers and the continued  presence of 
the Uganda  People’s  Defence Force  (UPDF) in foreign  countries  would  mean  for 
civilians. Civilian experiences have largely been ignored, although  particularly  South 
Sudanese have for years hosted the Ugandan army in its pursuit  of the rebel Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), and its leader Joseph Kony. Civilians have been in the midst of 
military  attempts  to end the conflict between the Ugandan government  and the 
  
 
LRA,  started  in the mid-1980s when the LRA was a primarily  Acholi rebel group. 
This article gives an overview of LRA presence and UPDF engagement in Sudan, 
illustrating  how civilians experienced the UPDF. The article argues that with a loose 
and largely unmonitored mandate  to pursue the LRA, the UPDF in Sudan has 
contributed to militarisation, atrocities  and illegal resource exploitation. Systematic 
human rights abuses have devalued the army’s limited military successes in pursuit of 
the LRA. The UPDF presence in Sudan also contributed to the failure of peace talks 
between  the  LRA  and  the  Government of Uganda  and  more  generally  hindered 
Southern  Sudan’s  transition to peace after  the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace  Agreement   between   the   Sudanese   government   and   the   Sudan   Peoples 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).  As similar patterns  of UPDF engagement 
are being repeated with international support  in an attempt  to end LRA violence, the 
article concludes that  disregard  for the realities of UPDF intervention  points  to a 
larger  problem.  Evidence  is limited  that  military  engagement  by an  unmonitored 
army  will end LRA violence or create  a peaceful environment.  Yet military  action 
through  the  UPDF continues  to  be touted  as the  most  credible  way to  end  this 
conflict,   although   abuses  of  civilians  are  an  integral   part   of  such  a  military 
intervention, rather  than  an aberration. Civilians are paying the price. 
 
 
 
Method 
This article is based on more than 600 author  interviews with civilians, LRA members, 
UPDF soldiers,  aid  workers  and  South  Sudanese  government  officials  conducted 
between 2005 and 2011 in Uganda  and Sudan,  with a particular focus on areas with 
UPDF presence  from  2006 to  2009. Only a fraction  of these interviews is quoted 
directly. During the Juba Peace talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, 
the author conducted a total of about 10 months fieldwork. Additionally in June 2008, a 
research  team of four people spent a month  conducting  169 guided interviews with 
civilians and 39 in-depth interviews with local leaders, government officials or members of  
Peace  Committees  in  LRA  affected  areas  in  Eastern  and  Central  Equatoria.4 
Interviewees’ names are withheld when requested. The geographical territory described 
here was considered Sudan, Southern  Sudan and South Sudan during the time frame 
this article covers. At times respondents  use the terms interchangeably. 
 
 
 
Ugandan armed groups in Sudan 
The LRA 
In November 1993, a 13-year-old boy from Magwi in South Sudan was walking in the 
bush near the Ugandan border when he encountered a group of armed men relaxing 
under a tree. How is life in Sudan, they asked him, their guns casually slung over their 
shoulders  during  the  friendly  chat.  Like  the  boy,  they  spoke  Acholi,  introducing 
themselves in their shared language. We are ‘‘the Lord’s Resistance  Army’’, the men 
said; we are here to overthrow the Ugandan government.  The boy, who since he could 
remember had known only war in Sudan, had never heard of the LRA. ‘‘It sounded 
funny to me,’’ he recalled, 13 years later. ‘‘I didn’t know who they were and what they 
were doing in Sudan. Before they joined the Arabs, they were friendly.’’5 
  
 
Eastern  Equatorians first became aware  in 1991 that  the SPLA was fighting  a 
foreign  armed   group.6   Residents  were  unsure  who  this  group   was,  but  in  the 
beginning  it  seemed  benign.  One  man  in  Palotaka recounted  that  the  LRA  was 
viewed with  respect  in  early  1994  because  it  ‘‘helped  the  people  suffering  with 
paralysis  and  heal them  traditionally’’.7  The LRA  initially had  crossed the border 
into Sudan to find refuge from fighting in Uganda, but soon tapped  into anti-SPLA 
sentiment  among  Equatorians  in  the  regions.8    It  connected  with  the  Equatoria 
Defense  Force  (EDF),   a  politically  strong  anti-SPLA   force,  with  Acholi,  Madi, 
Lokoya,   Lolubo,   and  Iyire  and   Lotuko   members   sponsored   by  the  Sudanese 
government.   After  an  SPLA  attack,   the  LRA  helped  the  EDF  to  safety  in  the 
government-held southern  capital Juba, as the EDF’s former Secretary General 
recounted.9 Sudan’s army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), made the LRA its proxy 
force around  1993.10  An SAF soldier who fought  side-by-side with the LRA  in the 
Yei area in the early 2000s recalled that  it had made sense to him to be teamed  up 
with  the  LRA   after   LRA   soldiers  had   explained   to   him  that   the  Ugandan 
government  was supporting  the  SPLA  and  so it was only  fair  that  the  LRA  get 
support  from the SAF.11 Khartoum’s support  changed the LRA’s behaviour,  said 
residents. 
In 1994, the LRA began to turn against Sudanese civilians, looting property  and 
later abducting  and killing Sudanese.12 Khartoum’s food, weapons and ammunition 
deliveries made  the LRA  a lethal force in Sudan,  and  aided  its continued  fight in 
Uganda. The LRA presence became devastating  for Sudanese civilians. According to 
one international security expert, the LRA effectively ‘‘emptied Eastern  Equatoria’’, an 
area that  prior  to 1983 had been heavily populated.13  The LRA’s Sudan  base at Aru-
Kubi, home  to 3-4000  fighters,  was nicknamed  ‘‘New  Gulu’’  (after  the main town  
in the LRA’s  home  base northern Uganda)  or ‘‘Kony  Village’’, and  was the LRA’s 
headquarters from 1994 to 1997. 
Fighting  was fierce in Eastern  Equatoria. Bullets replaced money as the most 
common currency in Palotaka market. The SAF and their militias controlled Magwi, 
Pajok,  Torit  and  Owiny-Kibul.  The  SPLA  held  Nimule;  Torit  was  fought  over. 
After  the  SPLA  overran  Aru-Kubi, the  LRA  established  semi-permanent  bases 
around  Jebel Lin, Pager,  Rubangateka, Magwi,  Gambera, Illyria  and  the Imatong 
Mountains. Tibika,  Alire, Pajok  and  Lerwa were LRA-held  territory;  ammunition 
was reportedly  hidden  in the nearby  mountains.14  From  1996, the LRA  conducted 
behind-the-lines  operations against the SPLA, using tactics that mirrored  those used 
by the SAF,  suggesting the LRA  had  been trained  by Khartoum in 1960s British- 
style anti-ambush drills and jungle fighting.
15  
However,  despite being a proxy force 
for Khartoum, the LRA was known to ‘‘attack all sides’’, even Sudanese government 
affiliates, recounted  a community leader. Mainly, however, the arrangement was that 
‘‘Arabs were sitting in the headquarter and they were the outpost, [LRA] were just 
attacking  SPLA with Arab  together.’’16 
While the LRA troops remained semi-mobile, the LRA leadership became settled in 
SAF-held Juba from 1997 until the early 2000s. The LRA had a school; Kony’s house 
was known  to Juba  residents,  who also remember  regular  sightings of the LRA  in 
government  trucks  and selling charcoal  in the market.  In 2003, one of Kony’s wives 
delivered a baby by Caesarean section in Juba Hospital. Staying in Juba invigorated the 
LRA’s fighting capacity, causing a second wave of displacement in Eastern  Equatoria 
  
 
because the LRA ‘‘came back from Juba with new weapons and bullets, many rounds, 
that’s why people run away from here’’, according to the chief of Owiny-Kibul.17 
The  impact  of  LRA  violence  in  Eastern   Equatoria was  severe.  An  Acholi 
community  leader  said,  ‘‘people  had  it very rough  from  LRA’’.18   The  immediate 
border  area between Uganda  and  Sudan  was most  heavily affected,  but  the LRA’s 
impact  stretched  from  the Imatong  Mountains in the east, where the LRA  stayed 
until  2005, to Juba  and  Yei in Central  Equatoria. In 2000 the LRA  established  a 
greater  presence in the area around  Yei in Central  Equatoria. An SAF soldier said 
that  as late as 2002, he was paired with an LRA force of about  10,000 soldiers near 
Kaya River outside Yei.19  Since 2005, the LRA has attacked  in vast areas of Western 
Equatoria and the western part of Central  Equatoria. In 2002 the Sudanese town of 
Katire  in the Imatong  Mountains was attacked  in what remains  possibly the worst 
LRA  massacre on Sudanese soil. 
Some local authorities  kept records  of LRA violence. Authorities in Ikotos  and 
religious leaders who returned  to Katire after the 2002 massacre said that 520 people 
were killed. The records of the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in 
Ikotos  County  show that over the course of about  three years in Ikotos  County,  the 
LRA  burnt   down  33  villages  and  killed  a  total  of  840  people,  including  those 
massacred in Katire. Fifty-four  people were still missing from Ikotos County in 2008. 
Magwi County  records  stated  in 2008 that  the LRA  killed 1536 residents,  with 72 
missing. When 169 people in 13 villages were asked in June 2008 how many family 
members were still missing, the total number was 102 (see Table 1 ).20  Forces that had 
been identified as SPLA or SAF had reportedly  taken 22 of the 102 people missing. 
Nineteen people had returned after being abducted.21 LRA violence also affected 
Sudanese who had sought refuge in Uganda. The massacre at Achol-Pii refugee camp 
in 1996 is the most gruesome of many attacks  on Sudanese refugees in Uganda.22 
 
 
Table 1.    Family members missing from families in Eastern  Equatorian villages in 2008. 
 
Village (number  
of interviewees) 
Family  members 
missing 
Missing, but 
later 
returned 
 
Aru-Kubi IDPs  (19) 7 2 
Aru Kubi  (24) 10 1 
Panyikwara  (15) 1 5 
Magwi Town (17) 4 (1 abducted  by SPLA) 1 
Obbo  (12)  1 
Pajok  (Parajok)  (21) 4 4 
Ikotos  (4) 13  
Imatong  Centre (5) 14  
Lohayiro  village (4) 30 (11 abducted  by LRA,  19 by SPLA) 1 
Tseretenya  Town (17) 8 1 
Lyria (11) 4 (1 missing in war, not abducted) 2 
Lokiliri boma  (15) 6 (1 taken  by SAF in 1987)  
Sodoni  (5) 1 (missing since 1987) 1 
Total  interviewed: 169 102  
  
 
 
In 1999 the Carter  Center brokered  the Nairobi  Agreement  between Sudan  
and Uganda. The agreement officially stopped Khartoum’s support  for the LRA 
and Kampala’s support  for the SPLA.23 From the beginning, it was doubtful  that 
the agreement would bring lasting peace.24  Indeed the debate whether Khartoum still 
supports  the LRA continues until today. LRA fighters tended to be dismissive of 
the Nairobi  Agreement,  since it did not  involve the LRA  leadership  and  ended  
peace efforts under way in Uganda.25 When the news of the Nairobi  agreement 
reached the battlefield, LRA soldiers reportedly told their SAF colleagues about this 
agreement between Uganda and Khartoum, ‘‘that you hand over my rebels and I 
hand over your rebels, so when the LRA heard that, they disappeared from there’’, 
recounted an SAF soldier who had been paired with the LRA. A few days later, LRA 
soldiers returned to the SAF camp they had just left to attack  their former allies 
and loot food.26 
 
 
 
The 
UPDF 
Uganda’s  army,  the  UPDF, was  unofficially  deployed  in  Sudan  throughout  
the 1990s, said civilians, SPLA soldiers and UPDF officers. Eastern  Equatorians 
sighted troops  more regularly from 1996 onwards.  A former SPLA soldier 
remembered  how the UPDF helped the SPLA with intelligence in 1995 against 
SAF forces in Eastern Equatoria.27  From  1995 to 1996, the UPDF fought  the 
LRA  at Achwa River near Nimule,  but  was  defeated.  When  the  UPDF 
withdrew,  recalled  a  former  SPLA fighter,  the Ugandan leadership  called on the 
SPLA which had  tanks  stationed  in nearby Pageri. Reports  circulated among 
soldiers stated that, at this point, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda  and Dr 
John Garang, the leader of the SPLA, arrived together  in a helicopter.  Garang  
reportedly  ordered  the SPLA to clear the road  for the UPDF. 
In the lead-up to the 1997 battle  of Yei, the UPDF helped the SPLA to 
capture the town of Kaya a few days before the march on Yei. Ugandan soldiers 
positioned their  machine  guns on site at Koboko Mountain to support  the 
SPLA’s successful incursion  into  Yei  - a  military  offensive  in  the  end  facilitated  
primarily  by  an Ethiopian tank  unit.  For  the  UPDF, capturing  Kaya  and  
taking  up  position  on Koboko Mountain was an important strategic win: the SAF 
had been launching missiles from the mountain into Uganda  in retaliation because 
Uganda  let the SPLA use Ugandan roads.28 
In  2002,  on  the  back  of  the  Nairobi   agreement,  the  Khartoum 
government allowed  the  UPDF to  conduct  a  major  military  operation against  
the  LRA  on Sudanese soil. For Khartoum, keen to be removed from the US list of 
state sponsors of terrorism,  this permission was a step to establish post-9/11 
relations with the US, who in December 2001 included the LRA on the list of 
terrorist  organisations at the request of the Government of Uganda. The 2002 
military offensive Operation Iron Fist was touted  by the UPDF as a push to 
eradicate  the LRA,  but did not succeed. Instead  the situation  deteriorated 
dramatically,  as Rodriguez  described: ‘‘Operation Iron  Fist has been a catastrophe 
for the people of northern Uganda. Kony  evaded capture  and most of the LRA  
  
 
poured  into northern Uganda. Ever since, people in the  north  have  suffered  
more  atrocities  than  in previous  years.’’29   As a  result  of Operation Iron  Fist,  
the numbers  of displaced people rose from around  400,000 to 
1.6 million, with displaced people estimated to be more than  2 million at the 
height of displacement  in Uganda.30 
For Sudan’s Equatorians, the experience was not much better. During  
Operation Iron Fist, the UPDF remained primarily stationed  near the border,  in 
Magwi and in Palotaka, but  later  its  presence  spread.  After  a  2003 LRA  attack  
on  the  SPLA barracks  in Pajok,  with nine SPLA dead, the UPDF established  a 
Palotaka base.31 
Residents  assumed  that  the UPDF was dispatched  into  areas  were the SPLA 
was struggling  to contain  violence.
32   
Nimule  became home to a major  UPDF 
outpost, with  incursions  towards  Pager  and  Moli.33  In  2005, the  UPDF held  
positions  in Western Equatoria.34 When the LRA moved into the Democratic  
Republic of Congo (DRC)  the same year, Uganda’s President  Museveni considered 
sending troops  into DRC  to destroy  the LRA.35 
Although  the initial Sudanese  mandate  that  allowed UPDF military 
operations against  the  LRA  expired  in  early  2006,  the  UPDF  maintained a  
controversial presence during the following years. That the UPDF stayed on - 
despite the fact that local politicians and residents called their stay ‘‘illegal’’ - was 
based on an informal agreement   between  the  semi-autonomous  Southern   
Sudan   and   Kampala. Not everyone  in  the  southern   government   was  
comfortable   with  this.  Vice-President Machar  gave as one of his reasons to pursue 
peace talks with the LRA to end UPDF presence  in Sudan  - ‘‘I  don’t  feel very 
comfortable  under  a foreign  invasion,’’  he explained.36  
The  foreign  army  made  it  more  difficult  to  pursue  his  position   as  a  
peace mediator.  Between 2006 and 2008 representatives  of the LRA and its civil 
wing, the LRM  and the Government of Uganda  conducted  peace talks under  the 
auspices of the Government of Southern  Sudan, specifically with Machar  as a 
mediator,  in Juba. During  the Juba  Peace Talks,37  the UPDF maintained positions  
near the LRA,  at times increasing its numbers,  despite the signing in late August 
2006 of an agreement on Cessation  of Hostilities which stipulated  no UPDF 
redeployment  in Sudan.38 In reality the UPDF spread its area of operation to the 
north, nearer to Juba, and to the west, as the LRA  moved across to the DRC. 
In the Juba  Peace Talks, the army movement  became a major sticking point  
for the LRA,  when troops  appeared  around  the agreed LRA  assembly area.  
‘‘There is now a lot of UPDF around  Owiny-Kibul.  I want to ask the mediator  
why,’’ said the then LRA second-in-command Vincent Otti in September 2006, 
explaining why the LRA’s  assembly  in the  area  had  become  problematic.39  A few 
months  later,  UN security  reported  that  aerial  surveys  had  shown  that  ‘‘the  
UPDF had  effectively kettled  the LRA  assembly area’’.40  In December  2006, 
Kony  spoke  to a group  of visitors   a  few  kilometres   from   Western   
Equatoria’s   Ri-Kwangba,  the   second designated  assembly area for the LRA.  He 
stated  that  ‘‘while talking  there is troop movement  from Eastern  Equatoria to 
here, seven miles from here’’.41 
  
 
By mid-2008 the UPDF had been seen around  Yei, Maridi, and close to the LRA 
assembly area in Nabanga.42 Further east, UPDF activities in Eastern Equatoria 
had calmed down in 2008, yet what an SPLA commander  called ‘‘a full force’’ 
remained in position  at Aru Junction  on the Juba-Nimule road.43 Direct 
encounters  between 
the LRA  and UPDF remained  scarce. Before the Juba  Talks could produce  a 
final peace  agreement,   the  UPDF in  December  2008  launched   Operation  
Lightning Thunder,  a military offensive supported by the US. While the operation 
was a failure, it marked the start of free UPDF movement into the far north  of 
Western Equatoria 
- as well as the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) - to chase the 
LRA.
44 
-  
Civilian experiences 
Operation Iron Fist, launched on the back of an internationally brokered  
agreement, and Operation Lightning  Thunder,  supported by the US, underscored 
how international misconceptions  about  the war between the LRA  and  the 
UPDF had devastating  consequences  for civilians. It has been argued  that  the 
UPDF’s lack of military professionalism  prolonged  the war in the north,  allowing 
for UPDF abuses of civilians.45   Despite  abundant evidence, the international 
community  had  largely underplayed the UPDF’s role in Uganda, particularly  in 
the displacement  of local populations and in committing  atrocities  against  
civilians.46  The UPDF’s incursion into Sudan received no oversight to ensure 
civilians’ safety, leaving Ugandan soldiers free to pursue its ‘‘counterinsurgency’’ in 
Sudan, including atrocities against the population. It left the civilian population 
exposed to an army implicated in gross violations  against  Ugandan civilians. 
Eastern  Equatorians generally explained the lack of protection afforded  them 
by the SPLA with the hostile history between Equatorians and the SPLA. 
Furthermore, they cited a blanket  accusation  against  Sudanese  Acholi, made by 
both  the SPLA and the UPDF, that Eastern  Equatorians were harbouring the 
LRA, and that collaboration between civilians and the LRA was the main reason 
why the LRA had survived for so long. This was an old accusation.  In 1995 Daniel 
Awet Akot, Minister of Internal  Affairs  in the early days of the Juba  Talks,  had  
accused the Sudanese Acholi of collaborating with the LRA to hurt the SPLA.47 In 
2007, during a renewed surge of attacks  by LRA  and other  armed  groups,  an 
SPLA commander  reiterated the accusation  in a newspaper article, although  up-to-
date evidence for the claim was not forthcoming: 
 
Some Equatorian tribes who are along the borders  with Uganda  are collaborating 
and hiding LRA in their houses without disclosing them to the authority. In this regard, 
how do you expect SPLA  to fight LRA  if some of you continue  to hiding  and  
protecting LRA?48 
 
Eastern  Equatorians, for  years  exposed  to  armed  attacks  without  
protection, have in the past developed flexible protection arrangements with armed 
groups. This often meant seeking immunity from LRA attacks  by providing  the 
LRA with food, shelter or information. It was a necessary survival technique,  and 
  
 
an experience that continues to divide communities. An ideological choice it was 
not, as one man in the market in Obbo pointed out: ‘‘It is hard to report if 
somebody comes at gunpoint.’’49 
An  international  staff  member   for  UN   security  who  had  worked   in  
Eastern 
Equatoria summed it up: ‘‘The community could not afford to be hostile to 
LRA.’’50 
The idea that the local community was guilty of supporting  the LRA came to 
the fore in the early days of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team. The team 
had been formed from LRA/M, SPLA and UPDF officers as part of the Juba 
Talks, after the  LRA  and  the  Ugandan government   signed  an  Agreement  on  
Cessation  of Hostilities  on  26  August  2006.  The  agreement   stipulated   that   
remaining   LRA fighters  would  assemble  in  Owiny-Kibul   by  the  end  of  
September   2006.  The departure of fighters remaining in Uganda  to assemble in 
Sudan was met with much press  coverage,  but  the  assembly  itself  was  less 
successful.  Soon  after  the  LRA fighters arrived in Owiny-Kibul,  they disappeared  
again, apparently after Kony had issued such orders.51 Rumours circulated that the 
LRA had been under UPDF threat or was deliberately  violating the agreement.  
Investigating   whether  the  LRA  had  assembled  or  the  UPDF deployed,  
the Cessation  of  Hostilities  Monitoring Team  travelled  to  Owiny-Kibul  on  
Monday, 2 October  2006 to inspect a site where the SPLA had  dropped  food  for 
the LRA. Residents reported  that the LRA had taken food, but had then 
disappeared. Grains from the food delivery had started  to germinate,  causing a 
controversy  about  when exactly the LRA had taken food. The only person able to 
verify when the LRA had appeared was the chief of Owiny-Kibul, who had 
personally reached out to the LRA to make them feel safe in his area, to facilitate 
their assembly and to further the peace talks.  The  chief  said  that   he  had  last  
seen  the  LRA  the  previous  Wednesday, 
27 September.  If the  LRA  had  been at  the  assembly  area  on  27 September,  
they would have fulfilled the conditions  of the Cessation  of Hostilities  Agreement.  
The UPDF officers,  however,  were  not  convinced  that   the  chief ’s  
information  was accurate.  ‘‘The chief is a very good liar,’’ one officer said. ‘‘I don’t 
believe LRA  left last Wednesday.  The germination  is too high.’’ When asked why 
the chief would lie about  this, he explained: ‘‘We do not believe that  he is really the 
chief because also these are the same people, the same culture as LRA.’’52 
 
 
Murky perpetrators 
The  Sudanese  war  environment,   with  attacks   by  numerous   armed  groups  
and complicated  linkages, was confusing  prior  to the LRA’s arrival;  the LRA  
presence added   an  extra  component  for  civilians.  ‘‘Tonk  Tonk’’  (literally  ‘‘chop  
chop’’) became the name used to describe the LRA,  but it was soon extended to 
any other armed group of unclear background. The leader of a women’s group who 
had stayed in Juba during the war said that ‘‘LRA has become the name for 
everybody who has done wrong. Bad people here, they say they are LRA.’’53 A UN 
security official explained, ‘‘Other groups are taking advantage.  The credibility of 
the LRA is based on the likelihood  of the LRA  attacking.’’54  Palotaka’s  parish  
  
 
priest said the ‘‘first finger has always gone to LRA.  People pointed  immediately 
and said it’s LRA.’’55  
The arrival  of the UPDF added  yet another  military actor. The point has been 
made repeatedly that the increased army presence in northern Uganda worsened the 
war experience for civilians, boosted the military budget and prolonged  the war.56 For 
Sudanese, volatility also grew with UPDF presence. During three years of research 
in areas with heavy UPDF presence, only a handful of respondents said that  they 
felt safer because of the UPDF: ‘‘I thank  Museveni for having sent his soldiers to 
Sudan, they have assisted a lot in controlling the LRA’’, said one man in Ikotos 
County, for example.57 The majority of respondents had a different view, along the 
lines of that expressed by a Madi youth leader in 2009: ‘‘The UPDF is a sleeping dog 
in Sudan. In Mugale, the UPDF does not do anything. UPDF itself is a problem.’’
58  
Civilians experienced increased militarisation as an exacerbation  of the war 
environment.  To the parish priest of Palotaka, it was secondary who was sending 
soldiers, as they always brought  trouble: ‘‘We consider UPDF soldiers. With soldiers, 
you cannot trust them. They will always misbehave.’’59  An Owiny-Kibul youth group 
complained  that UPDF gunships also killed Sudanese civilians.60 
Some of Eastern  Equatoria’s security problems  are home-grown  from 
continued tension   between   the   SPLA   and   Eastern   Equatorians.  Residents   
have   a   less than friendly relationship since the SPLA in the mid-1980s and early 
1990s forcefully recruited   in  the   area,   causing   mass   flight  to   Ugandan  and   
Kenyan   refugee camps.  The  Undersecretary for  Parliamentary Affairs  of  the  
Southern   Sudanese Government felt that armed groups in the area were cross-
pollinating  violence. Witnessing LRA  methods,  she said they had become 
increasingly brutal  as Sudan’s war deteriorated, she explained: 
 
This type of trying to make community  frightened.  Kill people and  hang  them up 
so when local people come, they don’t touch  anything.  I think  LRA  learned  these 
things from Southern  Sudan.  All people were partners  to frighten local communities  
who are caught  in a war and don’t know how to react.61 
 
During   the  Juba  Talks,  the  LRA/M   took  offence  at  the  blanket   
accusation regarding  all atrocities in Eastern  Equatoria; yet in the past the same 
accusation  had also strengthened  their fierce reputation. A Sudanese journalist  
explained, 
 
there  has always been a media  spin on casualties  caused by the LRA  . . .. For  a long 
time, such coverage was welcomed by the LRA as it made them seem very strong. It was 
also welcomed by the government  of Uganda  as it made the LRA seem vicious. And 
as of recent  [times], it was also welcomed  by the  government  of Southern  Sudan  
as it covered up the inadequacies  of their own security apparatus.62 
 
When 169 residents in 13 LRA-affected villages were asked to identify by whom 
they  had  been  attacked   or  by  whom  they  had  witnessed  an  attack,   
everyone remembered  at least one attack  by the LRA,  although  some of these 
happened  in Uganda. Each community  had,  however, been attacked  by several 
different groups (see Table 2 ). Six communities  had suffered attacks  from the 
  
 
UPDF.  
The  various  armed  groups  made  the  war  uncontrollable; civilian 
populations were caught in the escalating brutality. A Magwi woman explained that 
many women had been raped several times by soldiers of various armies and armed 
groups. To this day, she said, ‘‘Some women cannot even bear to look at men’s 
faces.’’63  For the then MP of Magwi County,  continued  LRA  attacks  happened  for 
other  reasons  beyond the county’s proximity to Uganda. Despite raising concerns 
as soon as the Southern Sudanese  government   was  formed,  she  felt  that  Magwi,  
perhaps  because  of  its history,  had been 
 
left out of wider participation in both  governments.  Magwi is a new county.  I feel 
that we have been marginalized  within  the marginalized  . . . . LRA  has brought  
instability, insecurity and mines . . . . Many of those attacking  wear LRA shoes. But the 
SPLA also commits atrocities  and that  makes insecurity very complex. Many  people 
have learned how to put on LRA  shoes . . . . EDF,  LRA,  UPDF, SPLA all wear the 
same uniform, they  wear  camouflage.   Some  atrocities   that   happened   in  daylight   
we  know  were LRA  . . . . The  [UPDF]  used to  commit  atrocities  in the  name  of 
the  LRA  . . . . The SPLA thinks that Acholi and Madi are supporting  the LRA,  but 
the Madi and Acholi are traumatized by all war parties: SPLA, LRA, [the government 
of Sudan], UPDF. The 
SPLA is not thanking  the communities  for being their war 
ground.64 
 
Just how difficult it was for the population to understand who was attacking  
them became clear in a simple request during the Juba Talks: the community asked 
whether the UPDF, SPLA and LRA could wear different uniforms so that they 
would be distinguishable.65 The issue of armies and armed groups moving about in 
identical gear came up again during Operation Lightning Thunder. Congolese 
refugees who had fled to Sudan had had similar experiences, explained a man in a 
camp near Yambio: 
Table 2.    Perpetrators of attacks  in Eastern  Equatoria. 
 
Aru-Kubi IDPs   LRA,  SAF, SPLA, Dinka,  Lokoya,  unidentified  armed 
group Aru Kubi  LRA,  UPDF, Lokoya,  SPLA, unidentified  bandits 
Panyikwara LRA,  Dinka,  unidentified  armed group 
Magwi Town  LRA,  SPLA, Dinka,  unidentified  armed  group 
Obbo  LRA,  UPDF, Iyire 
Pajok  (Parajok)   LRA,  UPDF, Bokec (Ugandan 
bandits) Ikotos  LRA,  UPDF 
Imatong  Centre   LRA,  Latuko 
Lohayiro village  LRA,  UPDF, SPLA 
Tsereteny
a 
Tow
n 
LRA,  UPDF, SPLA, Dinka/Nuer war, Didinga,  Logir, Karamojong, 
unidentified  OAG 
  
 
Lyria  LRA,  Murle,  SPLA, armed  
group Lokiliri boma  LRA,  SPLA, SAF, 
Lokoro, Sodoni Sodoni village LRA,  SPLA, 
SAF 
 
 
Something  that  is causing  problems  concerning  this  Ugandan army  because  if 
they come out of the bush, there is no way to differentiate  between UPDF and LRA.  
When we ran to Ganguran, we saw these soldiers in their clothes and we ran because 
we did not know who they were. When the people are running from the soldiers, the 
soldiers try to see if the people have guns. If you don’t have guns they will not 
shoot.66 
 
A February 2011 assessment by the Joint  Intelligence Operations Centre  of 
the UN mission in DRC  reported  that while attacks with abductions were 
identifiable as LRA,  attacks  had been carried  out in a variety of fashion: 
 
The  threat  picture  had  become  unclear  leading  to  speculation.  Haut  Uele’s  
security situation   was  never  binary:   FARDC,  UPDF,  SPLA,   poachers,   criminals   
groups, Mbororos and simple bandits  have all been scrutinized alongside LRA  - the 
challenge continues  to be detecting which.67 
 
The same report  discussed suspicions the UPDF was ‘‘responsible for a 
number of attacks’’, but concedes that while it ‘‘would be naı¨ve to believe that 
former UPDF or elements of serving UPDF have not been involved in attacks  at 
some point’’ this was unlikely to be routine  and that  the Congolose  forces wanted  
the UPDF out of DRC  and thus had a reason to discredit the Ugandan forces. 
However, it was acknowledged  that  the  UPDF failed  to  disclose  exact  troop   
locations  and  was keeping patrols  secret. In early 2012, CAR and DRC  civil 
society leaders expressed concerns about  unmonitored UPDF operations. ‘‘UPDF 
is working in rural areas’’, explained a man from the CAR, ‘‘the army of CAR is 
working in urban  areas. There are some suspicions about  what is going on with the 
UPDF.’’ It was hard to address, he added,  because the UPDF could not  speak to 
civilians because of the language barrier.68  The  UN  mission  in  DRC  stated  in  
their  report  that  they  hoped  that pressure could be applied on the UPDF ‘‘to 
be more transparent and honest’’, but that the UPDF countered  such pressure 
with emphasising their efforts in Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab.69 
 
LRA/UPDF 
encounters 
In UN security circles, a common joke in 2006 was, ‘‘Why is the UPDF in Sudan? To 
make  sure  the  LRA  does  not  get  destroyed.’’70   Kaldor   conceptualises  war  as  a 
‘‘mutual enterprise’’ between warring parties.71 Branch illustrates  how in the war in 
northern Uganda, this mutual  enterprise  included  all ‘‘the parties with political  or 
economic   power   - Museveni,  the  UPDF,  the  United   States,  the  other   
donor governments  and  institutions’’  because  neither  saw a benefit  in ending  the  
war.72 
Sudanese civilians’ memories of UPDF/LRA encounters  in Sudan illustrate how 
  
 
this mutual  enterprise  played out. In the early days of official UPDF presence, 
residents did  not  realise  that  the  UPDF had  come  to  fight  the  LRA.  One  
respondent  in Imatong  explained that  there was 
 
a lot of fighting  between SPLA  and  LRA,  but  not  LRA  and  UPDF. UPDF did 
not engage in battle  that  much.  It  was very funny;  the UPDF even supported the 
LRA. When the SPLA attacked  the LRA,  the UPDF said ‘‘why do you do that? Why 
do you kill people?’’ When the SPLA entered after LRA attacks,  the UPDF said, ‘‘no, 
no, no, let us go back’’. Maybe  they were just making  indirect interaction.73 
 
A member of the Eastern  Equatoria Assembly explained that 
 
since the UPDF came to Sudan,  they never had a face-to-face confrontation with 
the LRA.  It’s like the LRA  has been given safe passage. People wonder,  why is the 
UPDF here? If that  presence in Sudan can still aggravate  tension with the LRA,  why 
can they not move behind fire lines? The UPDF should be asked politely to leave. 
Their presence is not very wise to reach a tangible peace with the LRA.74 
 
UPDF information about  battles with the LRA was limited to announcements 
of spectacular  victories.  With  little other  information, it seemed for a while as if 
the 
2002 Operation Iron Fist was going rather  well. Individual  UPDF soldiers, 
however, 
said that  they were often puzzled by the LRA  they encountered in 
Sudan: 
 
[LRA] had all small arms that you can think of, but also other support  weapons, 
given by Arabs.  In fact they had the anti-aircraft weapons, the twin barrel,  which they 
could easily carry, they had the B2, which they used to hit at our armoured vehicles and 
tanks. They were well equipped  and  in fact before UPDF acquired  a grenade  
launcher,  they were the first people to acquire  them. I remember  one time they 
attacked  a very good group of UPDF fighters using grenade launchers  and we were 
wondering  what sort of gun they were using. When one of our people picked the 
cartridge  and we examined it, that’s when we got to know that  these fellows were far 
advanced  than  us. 
 
The UPDF, this man  further  explained,  then  asked  other  countries  for help 
to equip  them  with  similar  weaponry:  ‘‘If  it  wasn’t  for  our  good  relationship  
with some of our friends who had that gun and we borrowed  a few pieces, I think 
we were in shit.’’75 
The  LRA’s  military  superiority  meant  that  Sudanese  civilians did  not  benefit 
from  the presence of the Ugandan soldiers. The chairman  of the Sudanese  
Acholi community in Juba explained, ‘‘The resentment  of people is that [UPDF] 
were never defending  them.  They  did  not  go  on  a  very  effective  encounter   
with  the  LRA although    their   mission   was   to   fight   them.’’76     Sudanese   
traders   particularly complained  about  the  lack  of  protection from  the  UPDF. 
A  2007 report  states that  in Agoro  the UPDF positioned  its barracks  in the 
middle of the village, using civilians  living on  the  outskirts  as  human  shields,  and  
only  responding  to  LRA attacks  long after the LRA  had already  left.77 
  
 
Seven respondents used the image of twins to describe the ‘‘mutual enterprise’’ of 
the UPDF and the LRA. One man explained, ‘‘When [the] community reported  
that LRA has crossed, UPDF said we are twins, like Opio Ocen. Ocen is the brother  
in the bush, how can I stab my brother?  Do you want our mother  to cry?’’78  In the 
eyes of the chairman of the Acholi community in Juba, this tight connection between 
two opponents  was  a  natural   outcome   of  transplanting  two   foreign   forces  
to   a battleground to which neither  had particular attachment: 
 
I know some of these UPDF. Some of them are actually from northern Uganda  and 
to kill  their  own  people  they  did  not  want  to  strictly  get  involved.  They  resorted  
to destruction of the area and cutting  trees in our forest. People really resent them.79 
 
The UPDF’s pursuit of the LRA on foreign territory seemed weak at best, 
despite the  public  narrative  in Uganda  that  ‘‘the  efforts  of the  gallant  UPDF 
which has greatly degraded  the LRA,  and,  among  others,  rescued 17,000 children  
from LRA abduction where they were serving as child soldiers and sex slaves’’, in 
the words of Ugandan ambassador Kabonero, were a great anti-insurgency  success 
story.80 
 
 
UPDF  atrocities against civilians 
Numerous respondents  gave concrete examples of UPDF abuses, although  it 
remains difficult to ascertain exactly which armed group killed how many people. 
Uganda’s Sunday Monitor wrote that  between 1993 and January  2007, 5200 people 
in Greater Equatoria had  been killed by either the LRA  or the UPDF, but  the 
source of the information is unclear.81  Speaking  in June  2008, the executive chief 
of Pajok  gave examples of UPDF atrocities. 
 
This force was sent to look for LRA in Southern  Sudan and should protect  and 
provide security to the civil society in Southern  Sudan. But to our surprise, UPDF 
behave also like LRA. They have killed six people and wounded three in Pajok. They lay 
ambush on the road  and take motorbike, bicycles or property,  money, or kill you if 
you don’t run. These happened  between Komormo and Pogee, Pajok. When they get 
you in the bush or any isolated locations,  they kill you immediately without  asking 
whether you are LRA or not. They killed three boys fishing again; they shot a boy in 
the compound. All these have proven  with evidences. 
UPDF create information, which is not true in order to kill and lay ambush on the 
road in  the   name   of  LRA.   Recently   UPDF  killed  [a  man   named]   Sokondo.   
They also  robbed  some  boys  riding  bicycles and  carrying  some  items  between  
Pajok  and Owiny-Kibul,  some two days ago. 
UPDF do not attack  LRA, even if you report to them. They said: ‘‘Let the LRA 
. . . what  do you want? I can harm  yourself with a knife.’’ This makes reconciliation  
very difficult unless they sign [a peace deal], then we can talk.  [The Ugandan 
government] should do something in areas affected by LRA and UPDF because the 
two forces are all Ugandan. So [the Ugandan government] should be accountable for 
destructions.82 
 
During  the Juba Talks, Eastern  Equatorians published a communique´  to be 
read out at the negotiation table. It outlined  a list of UPDF atrocities: 
 
  
 
For example, instead of following and attacking  the LRA, they turned  their guns to 
the civil population, shooting,  looting,  raping  and burning  their huts in pretext of 
chasing the LRA.  For  example, 10 people in Lulobo  were killed, also in Madi  area 
two people killed and others wounded  in the process. At Kitire [sic] in 2004, the 
UPDF killed the three escorts assigned to lead them to the hideout  of the LRA.83 
 
The  communique´   argued  that  abuses  of  civilians  by  UPDF soldiers  ‘‘were  and 
still are intentional’’  and  that  ‘‘the  UPDF did not  fulfil their  mission to 
Southern Sudan’’.84 
In 2006, said the chief of Owiny-Kibul,  the UPDF killed four  residents  of 
his area,  and  ‘‘UPDF also attacked  and  pretended  to be LRA’’.85  An Ikotos  
religious leader explained ‘‘UPDF looted and raped here, mainly in Katire. People in 
the mountains were very hostile to UPDF.’’
86  
The UPDF engaged locals to help 
them find the LRA, said a Juba woman. Once the Sudanese had led the Ugandan 
soldiers to the LRA bases, the ‘‘guides’’ were threatened and told that  they would 
be killed. The reasoning  was that  only LRA  collaborators would know the 
hideouts.87 
Residents  say that  the UPDF committed  atrocities  pretending  to be the 
LRA. A woman in Magwi explained, ‘‘Sometimes when the UPDF did not have 
anything to eat, they turn and pretend  to be the LRA and ambush you.’’88  One 
international security worker summed it up: ‘‘The UPDF orchestrated a lot of 
stuff.’’89  In a typical UPDF ambush,  as described  by residents  of Aru  Junction,  
the  Ugandan  soldiers would set road ambushes  on the road connecting Juba and 
Nimule. ‘‘They stop you on the road,  they say to you ‘I am LRA, these are the 
politics of [Sudan’s president] Omar  Bashir.’ And then they capture  you, they take 
everything.’’90 
The notorious 105th battalion of the UPDF, comprised  of former LRA 
fighters with unclear command  structures,  was also dispatched to Sudan. The 105th 
battalion is a reminder  of the complex nature  of a war in which former  rebels join 
armies to fight rebels, but also use rebel tactics. In Sudan, the 105th conducted what 
one international observer at the Juba Talks called ‘‘pseudo-operations’’.91  Elders in 
the Magwi area explained that  each time the Ugandan press announced an 
increase in LRA movement, residents experienced looting and harassment, even if 
no LRA had been  spotted  locally.  Government officials in Magwi  County  
explained  that  most looting  happened  near UPDF trucks:  ‘‘Most of the witnesses 
can recognise UPDF because some of them have seen them before when a truck 
moves’’, one local administrator said. ‘‘When a truck  moved to a point  where there 
was no LRA  and then something happens, people are suspicious.’’92  Reports  that 
the UPDF had hired residents to help them stage ambushes  fed further  suspicion. 
In Ikotos,  residents reported  that  the UPDF targeted  businessmen  
transporting goods and cattle. In a 2007 report,  a resident of Ikotos  County  
described encounters with the UPDF: 
 
And they claim that  that  is the LRA  . . . Those causing atrocities  along the roads  
here are  not  really  the  LRA  alone;  sometimes  they  are  [Ugandan]  government  
militias. Normally  when they see a vehicle coming and  it is loaded with goods, if 
there are no SPLA soldiers on the vehicle, they attack  and loot the vehicle. The 
reason  I am saying this is that there was a time when some ‘‘bandits’’ clashed with the 
  
 
SPLA around  Ikotos. It happened  that one of those wounded in the clash was found 
in Madi Opei hospital in Uganda. If that  was an LRA,  I don’t think  the UPDF 
would have allowed him in the government  hospital.93 
 
The environment  and information policy was confusing. In June 2008, the Juba 
Peace  Talks  Cessation  of  Hostilities  Monitoring Team  submitted   a  confidential 
report to the Government of Southern  Sudan regarding activities of an armed 
group at Pageri payam on 14 June 2008. About  30 men had raided five houses in 
Nyongwa village, abducting  a 31-year-old  man  who was found  dead  three  days 
later  with a head  injury  and  a  stab  wound  to  the  back.  Near  the  site  where  
the  body  was discovered  two  bags  with  military  clothing  and  provisions  were  
discovered.  The attackers  seemed to have eaten canned beans and biscuits. The 
SPLA detachment at Loa  identified  the  materials  as belonging  to  the  UPDF, 
although  the  monitoring team was unable to verify whether the attack  was indeed 
carried out by the UPDF.94 
South Sudan’s Vice-President Riek Machar  relayed these findings to parliament. 
Uganda’s government-owned paper  New Vision later reported  that  it had  obtained 
documents   implicating  the  LRA  in  the  incident,  and  that  the  UPDF had  
been cleared during a meeting between the UPDF and SPLA in Nimule nine days 
later on 25 June. The reports  of that  meeting are somewhat  confusing, seemingly 
making no reference to the monitoring team’s ambivalent  report.  The New Vision 
reported  that the meeting’s minutes  had  been signed by SPLA commanding officer 
Col. Haruna Abai and Col. Sam Kavuma  for the UPDF, and that  ‘‘no one quoted  
having come across a simple piece of information implicating the UPDF in the 
act’’.95 
An attack  in Nabanga payam in Western Equatoria was carried out by the 
LRA, according  to the Cessation  of Hostilities  Monitoring Team.  The finding  
was later revised after the team found materials near the scene of the killing that 
implicated the UPDF  masquerading as  the  LRA,  including  the  names  of  the  
suspected  UPDF soldiers from ‘‘Section II, Platoon  I, ‘A’ Coy’’.96 
These examples show that  opportunities for thorough investigations  are 
limited, thus armed  groups  identify each other  as the culprit.  As no action  is 
taken  against any armed group, the situation  for civilians remains untenable.  In 
general, the UPDF shrugged off all accusations  that it was committing  atrocities 
while masquerading as the LRA. ‘‘The LRA are looking for all reasons to justify what 
has happened,’’ said a senior UPDF commander.97 He argued  that  the LRA  had  
been targeting  civilians and avoiding  the UPDF for years. 
 
 
 
The business of war 
Residents  resented  the UPDF because  the soldiers made  no attempt  to  hide 
their business interests,  said the chief of Owiny-Kibul: 
 
UPDF were just  making  business.  They don’t  want  to  fight.  If they  hear  that  
these people are this side of the road,  they stay there. Even in Uganda. They hear 
and they wait for several hours.  They don’t want to die. They want to make money.98 
 
The UPDF’s obvious business interests added  to the perception  that  the 
  
 
neighbour- ing government  used  its own  conflict  to  intimidate  people  across  the  
border  and improve  its  own  economic  position.   In  Ikotos,   one  interpretation  
was  that  the Ugandan government  wanted  to  keep Sudan  unstable  to  divert  
attention from  its own problems. Some Eastern Equatorians expressed concern 
that, with the arrival of the  UPDF,  several  disputed  border   regions  seemed  to  
have  passed  firmly  into Ugandan hands. 
The  most  obvious  lucrative  endeavour   was  the  logging  of  teak  in  
Eastern Equatoria’s  forests.  An  Owiny-Kibul  youth  group  saw  this  as  part  of  
a broader strategy:  for them it was proof  that  the Ugandan government  was ‘‘not 
serious for making peace with the LRA’’, and they argued that the UPDF was 
‘‘using the LRA war for making  money’’.99  When the UPDF ostensibly  withdrew  
from  the Owiny- Kibul area under the terms of the Cessation  of Hostilities 
Agreement signed by the LRA and the Ugandan government  in August 2006, 
locals reported  that the UPDF cut down 200 trees just outside Palotaka and 
ferried them across the border before it could be reported  to the authorities.100 
Accusations  of illegal logging in Sudan had been circulating in Uganda  for years; 
and Eastern Equatorians provided eyewitnesses. Magwi County’s commissioner 
clarified that before Sudan’s Comprehensive  Peace Agreement, the former 
Khartoum- aligned governor  had permitted  Ugandan traders  to do some logging; 
in return  the Ugandan traders were to build a community centre in Obbo. When the 
centre did not materialise, the permission expired. The logging did not stop. A 
young man at a community  meeting in Owiny-Kibul  said that  the soldiers took  
trees to Uganda  as bridge-building  material.  When  they were caught  logging in 
the forest,  they killed some civilians, and  at times ‘‘UPDF put  on different  
uniforms  to look like LRA’’. The UPDF in Sudan,  he concluded,  ‘‘they forget 
what they came for’’.101 
In September 2007, eyewitness testimony about  illegal logging by the UPDF was 
widely reported  in the press following the publication  of a report  I had 
written.102 
Asked directly about it, the UPDF dismissed the accusations: ‘‘Our duties are to 
look for rebels in Southern  Sudan, to maintain  law and order along the road. How 
can we look for timber?’’ said one UPDF officer. ‘‘It is illegal for anyone  to sell 
wood and timber  outside  Southern   Sudan.’’103   Reacting   to  the  accusations,   
the  Ugandan embassy in Sudan  wrote: 
 
The baseless allegations made against the UPDF should be dismissed with the 
contempt they  deserve.  They  are  aimed  at  undermining   the  image  of  Uganda   
and  its  good relationship with Sudan as well as demeaning the successful achievement 
of the UPDF against the LRA in Southern  Sudan. The UPDF which is now almost 
alone in Somalia on an Africa Union  Mission  is a Pan Africanist  Liberation Army 
which does not and will never loot. UPDF, surely does not deserve such unfounded 
accusations.104 
 
It was an irony picked up by many commentators, including people attending  
the Juba  Talks, that  the International Court  of Justice had ruled two years earlier 
that during  the UPDF presence in DRC  between 1995 and 2003, 
 
  
 
the Republic  of Uganda, by acts of looting,  plundering  and exploitation of 
Congolese natural  resources committed  by members of the Ugandan armed forces in 
the territory of  the  Democratic   Republic  of  the  Congo  and  by  its  failure  to  
comply  with  its obligations  as an occupying Power in Ituri district to prevent acts of 
looting, plundering and  exploitation   of  Congolese  natural   resources,  violated  
obligations   owed  to  the Democratic  Republic  of the Congo  under  international 
law.105 
 
The  proliferation  of  armed   groups   created   a  profitable   weapons-
circulating system between armed groups and civilians. The chief of Owiny-Kibul 
explained that during  the  1990s, weapons  for  government-aligned militias  always  
flowed  ‘‘from Torit because Arabs are there’’, while weapons for civilians reached the 
area through Uganda  or Ethiopia.  In addition,  the LRA sold weapons to civilians 
in exchange for information about  the SPLA’s whereabouts.106  With Operation 
Iron  Fist,  the local arms trade in Imatong  changed, said a member of the Ikotos 
Peace Committee: ‘‘The UPDF came in 2002, and  2002 was also when the guns 
came to  Imatong.’’107  In Ikotos  and  near  the Tsereteya  Mountains, UPDF guns 
and  ammunition fuelled a flourishing  gun market;  by extension,  armed  activity 
amongst  civilians in the area was assured.  The authorities  turned  a blind eye to 
the arms trade,  said a man from Torit  who was working  in Ikotos  at  the time.108  
A 2007 report  stated  ‘‘that  some elements  of  the  UPDF  contributed to  
insecurity  in  South   Sudan   by  weapons trading’’,  calling  on  the  Southern   
Sudanese  government   to  crack  down  on  the military  activities  of  its  army  and  
affiliated  militias.109  As  late  as  January   2008, residents saw UPDF soldiers 
bartering  their guns for food around  Kajo  Keji.110 
 
 
 
Impact on peace 
Undermining a peaceful resolution 
The direct impact of the UPDF presence on the Juba Talks goes beyond 
accusations and counter-accusations regarding  attacks  during  the negotiation 
period.  From  the standpoint of the LRA/M, the presence of the Ugandan army 
in Sudan  at the very time when sensitive political issues were addressed was a 
manifestation of the militarisation of Uganda  and the domestic role of the UPDF. 
Citing an example of the  UPDF’s  clash  with  the  Rwandan army  in  Kisangani,   
the  LRA/M   issued  a statement  that  underlined 
 
Uganda’s  lack of  respect  for  international law and  peaceful  co-existence  with  
other nations.  The known and unwelcome presence of the UPDF in many parts  of 
Southern Sudan,  well after  the protocol  allowing them to be in the Southern  Sudan  
expired in February 2006, smacks of impunity  and is a source of total  embarrassment 
to Uganda as a nation.111 
 
Some respondents in Eastern  Equatoria argued  that  Uganda  had  displaced  
its own  problems  of  army  violence  to  Sudan;  often  cited  was  the  UPDF’s  
crude approach to  the  Juba  Talks.  In  the  early  days  of  the  LRA  assembly  in  
Owiny- Kibul  in  September  2006,  residents  reported   that  about   100  LRA  
fighters  had peacefully  gathered   (although   whether   they  had   stayed  was  
  
 
contested,   as  the germination  debate  shows), trusting  a mere 23 SPLA soldiers 
for their  protection. The government-run Uganda  Media Centre then invited 
foreign diplomats and journalists  to view the assembled LRA  in Sudan.  As 
protection, Ugandan military vehicles  - two  mambas,   two  buffaloes,  two  trucks  
of  UPDF soldiers,  and  four military jeeps - escorted  the busload  of journalists  
and diplomats. 
The  SPLA  was not  informed  about  a  military  convoy  entering  Sudan.  
Word about  the  military  convoy  reached  the  LRA,  which  promptly  dispersed  
from  the assembly area for good, which caused the first major hitch in the talks. 
The convoy was in the end stopped by Sudanese civilians demanding  to see SPLA 
permission for this military movement.112 Residents around  the assembly area later 
often referred to this example when arguing  that  the Ugandan government  was 
pursuing  a hidden military agenda  to create barriers  to peace with the LRA.113 
With hindsight,  this incident might qualify as the single most damaging  
moment of the Juba Talks, derailing the assembly and reviving violence. The UPDF 
presence became arguably the greatest obstacle to any trust from the LRA leadership, 
either in peace talks or regarding future protection from the Ugandan government  
in case the LRA signed a deal. The double strategy of talking in Juba while 
simultaneously deploying military forces in Eastern  Equatoria was widely interpreted 
as a deliberate attempt  to sabotage  the peace talks. In community  meetings people 
regularly stated that   for  the  peace  talks  to  stand   a  chance  of  success,  the  
UPDF  had  to  be withdrawn.114 
The  presence  of the  UPDF, it was generally  concluded,  was ‘‘not  
convincing during peace talks’’, and did not provide leverage to speed that process 
along. It was seen  rather   as  delaying  community   healing,   as  it  was  expected  
that   the  two perpetrators, the LRA  and  the UPDF, would  never participate in 
a reconciliation process. The effect of providing  this military ‘‘leverage’’ might have 
been to make a peace deal impossible. 
Leverage is a frequently cited concept. In a violent conflict between state and 
non- state actors, leverage tends to be interpreted  as military pressure until an 
agreement is signed. Kleiboer  calls leverage ‘‘one  of the most  elusive elements of 
mediation.  It makes for fuzzy conceptualisations, and research produces 
contradictory results concerning its importance for successful mediation  outcomes. 
Few analysts bother to define leverage explicitly.’’115 Applying the concept of leverage 
to the Juba Talks highlights the fuzziness of the concept as the two parties at the 
table experienced very different kinds of leverage. International actors called for 
military pressure against the LRA. The Ugandan government  was, if at all, subtly 
pressured: it was hinted that its international reputation depended  on allowing this 
peace process  to be successful. Additionally,   the  US  maintained  its  close  and  
supportive   military  relationship throughout the talks  and  beyond.  The 
application of leverage thus was limited to immediate  security  concerns,  rather  
than  wider  issues of militarisation, structural violence and its impact on human  
security and development. 
With the military threat against the LRA thus often unofficially sanctioned by 
international  actors,   the  issue  highlighted  another   challenge  to  the  Juba  
peace process. The young government  of Southern  Sudan  was navigating  a fragile 
foreign peace  process  while  trying   to  nurture   its  relationship  with  Uganda,  
  
 
its  most important regional  ally. ‘‘It  is an intricate  relationship between the 
government  of Southern  Sudan and Uganda. It is hard to dismiss the UPDF in all 
of this,’’ said one international member of the mediation  team when trying to 
understand why the permission to the UPDF to move around  Sudan had been 
extended, although  it had become  an  impediment   to  the  peace  talks.  
Deflecting  calls  from  the  LRA/M delegation  to remove the UPDF from 
Sudan,  the Ugandan government  delegation claimed that the UPDF was there for 
‘‘other reasons than the LRA’’.116  Speculation what this meant was rife, usually 
concluding that the SPLA wanted UPDF backup to manage  its own security and 
to deter the SAF. 
 
 
Militarisation  in peace time 
The presence of the UPDF had an impact  on the Juba  Talks and on how 
civilians experienced   Southern   Sudan’s   own   transition  to   peace.   Southern   
Sudan   was desperately  trying  to  stabilise  its fragile north-south  peace, and  the 
presence of a foreign army added instability that caused great concern among the 
local population. In 2006, the sentiment was strong that the UPDF presence was 
undermining  Sudan’s fragile  peace.  During   a  community   meeting  in  Owiny-
Kibul   December  2006,  a resident shouted: 
 
The community  does not want LRA and UPDF in Southern  Sudan because they 
have suffered more than enough from the Southern  Sudan war . . .. SPLA and the 
Khartoum government  ended  the war,  we are now supposed  to  be free, why 
should  the foreign troops  be allowed to disturb  us? If SPLA  is not  serious,  Pajok  
land will be empty of people. The owners are kicked out of their houses.117 
 
He  was  frustrated that  the  SPLA  seemed  to  sanction  war  in  his  home  
area. Feeling abandoned by the SPLA, an Owiny-Kibul youth group had strong 
views on how protection could be guaranteed: since the Southern  Sudanese 
government  had failed  to  shelter  the  communities  from  the  UPDF or  to  ask  
the  UPDF to  leave Sudan,  the youth  requested  instead  that  the SPLA provide 
them with guns to fight off the UPDF themselves.118 
Eastern   Equatorians’  experience  of  peace  - and  fledgling  efforts  of  
civilian disarmament - were further  disturbed  because the UPDF presence also 
meant that Sudanese were being recruited as soldiers. This was particularly  reported  
of the 105th battalion, which needed  local knowledge  to  operate  effectively in 
Sudan.  Recruit- ment  primarily  occurred  in  camps  in  Uganda. Three  
respondents told  of family members who had been recruited  into the UPDF. In 
Nimule on 28 December 2005, the chief of Owiny-Kibul met a friend who had been 
signed up for the 105th battalion and  was  now  travelling  in  a  convoy  of  six  
UPDF lorries.  The  newly  recruited Sudanese  soldier was dispatched  to Jebel-Lin  
to fight the LRA,  wearing a UPDF uniform  and  talking  from  a  UPDF 
vehicle.  He  expressed  surprise  that  he  was arriving in his home country, which he 
had thought  to be at peace. The chief saw the same convoy return  empty to 
Uganda  on 9 January;  he deduced that  the forces had stayed in the bush. He 
expressed concern that  Sudanese were coming back to fight, and to go ‘‘against the 
  
 
new spirit of peace’’.119 
For   Eastern   Equatorians,  the   spirit   of   peace   required   reconciliation   
and the resolution  of personal grievances. This tends to involve compensation 
payments, particularly   for  lost  property   or  a  family  member   killed.  
Reconciliation  with the  UPDF had  been  promised,  but  proved  impossible.  
One  man  in  Pajok  said that  a UPDF officer killed his son and ‘‘I was promised  
to be compensated  for my son by a UPDF commander, but the UPDF did not 
come back up to now.’’120 
UPDF movement  contributed to the sentiment  that  peace had not  yet come 
to Sudan.  The movement  of UPDF gunships,  reported  in Magwi and Ikotos  
counties up to 2008, was often mentioned as a definitive sign that the current peace 
was not to be trusted;  as was the fact that  the UPDF had  planted  landmines  
along  the road from  Panyikwara  to  Magwi  when  the  army  moved  from  
Palotaka  and  Tibika, severely restricting  civilian movement.121 
In addition  to the residents’ general impression that  the army had made a 
peace deal impossible there was also a strong  sentiment  that  its presence would 
impede a peaceful life in other ways. One man said that even when both forces had 
left at some point in the future it would be up to those left behind to pick up the 
pieces on their own: ‘‘The  LRA  and  UPDF will eventually go away but  the civil 
population will remain  after enduring  all the killings and torture.’’122  The presence 
of soldiers also brought   with  it  a  reminder  that  human  security  requires  more  
than  absence  of physical violence. In Magwi County, the young men explained the 
long-term consequences of the foreign army presence: ‘‘The UPDF presence in 
Southern  Sudan has led to much prostitutions in the area which may escalate the 
spread of HIV/ AIDS.’’123 
As Sudanese joined the UPDF - usually recruited from camps in Uganda  - 
and civilians  demanded   to  be  armed  for  protection,  the  process  of  
demilitarization and peaceful return  to Sudan  was thrown  off course by the 
prospect  of livelihoods and careers in a foreign army. For returnees from Ugandan 
camps, encountering Sudanese soldiers in the UPDF in Sudan  created  a difficult 
situation.  A man from Pajok, whose cousin had joined the UPDF from Achol-Pii 
refugee camp in Uganda in 2005, explained that  for those returnees  who had 
come back to Sudan  to live in peace  in  their  own  country,   the  presence  of  the  
Ugandan  army,  fortified  with Sudanese soldiers, was disturbing.124 
In the Panyikwara area,  which most returnees  had fled for Uganda  in the mid- 
1980s to escape SPLA forced recruitment  campaigns,  it was unsettling  to return  
to the area to find both feared armies, the SPLA and the UPDF, working together. 
This led the returnees to believe that the SPLA was planning another  uprising 
against the Sudanese government,  using Eastern  Equatoria as a launch pad with the 
UPDF as a backup  force. ‘‘If the SPLA is planning  for another  rebellion  they 
should  tell that clearly to the community  rather  than  keeping the UPDF inside 
Sudan in a claim of fighting  the LRA when in fact they have failed to  defeat  the 
LRA  in the past  20 years,’’ one man in Owiny-Kibul  said.125 
Above  all,  the  UPDF presence  was  an  obstacle  to  the  transition  to  
peace, confirming Equatorians’ suspicions that the Southern  Sudanese government  
was not overly concerned  with how Equatorians fared in the peace.126  Writing  in 
  
 
the Sudan Tribune in 2005, one Equatorian outlined why he felt that  the UPDF 
presence had been damaging:  the UPDF were proof  that  Uganda  was moving  
its battlefield  to Southern  Sudan,  he argued.  The  forces had  sealed the  border  
to  assure  peace in Uganda  while fighting its war in Sudan;  more civilians than  
Ugandan soldiers had been killed by the LRA; the UPDF presence had decreased 
security in Magwi, Ame, Opari,  Pajok,  Agoro  and  Pageri;  people had  been re-
displaced  since the Ugandan forces had arrived; time spent fighting the LRA was 
time taken  away from Sudan’s own  peace  and  development   process;  the  
Southern   Sudanese   government   was misguided to hand over the task of fighting 
the LRA to Ugandans, and was hurting its own citizens in the process.127 
Local   mistrust   of  the   new  Southern   Sudanese   government   was  
manifest. Residents  of Eastern  Equatoria said that  the Southern  Sudanese  
government  was not concerned  about  their security; they also doubted  the 
strength  of an SPLA that needed a foreign army as backup.  ‘‘The SPLA seems to 
be weak because they have done nothing to chase away the UPDF, but instead they 
stay together,’’ said a young man from Owiny-Kibul.128 Rather  than viewing the 
UPDF presence as strengthening the  SPLA’s  capacity  to  protect  them,  for  those  
in the  affected  counties  it was an additional hostile force: ‘‘LRA and UPDF are 
the responsibility of Southern  Sudan since  they  are  both   in  Southern   Sudan.   
It  is  [up  to]  the  Southern   Sudanese government  to remove them from 
Southern  Sudan,’’ explained one man.129 
The  civilian experience  in Eastern  Equatoria has  shown  that,  as  Kaldor  
and Beebe argue, unless war activity prioritises the protection of the individual, it is 
likely to escalate the very violence it aims to prevent.130 This might be the main 
reason why violence against civilians persists in this volatile region. Kaldor  and Beebe 
identify an 
‘‘overly militarized perspective’’ and a ‘‘continued preoccupation with fighting wars 
and  attacking  enemies that  hampers  change’’.131   The  UPDF in Sudan  seemed 
to prove that  war cannot  end by countering  it with more war and  atrocities.  A 
youth group  in  Owiny-Kibul  outlined  their  fear  that  the  ‘‘long  presence  of  
UPDF  in Southern  Sudan  may likely plunge  [the Ugandan and  Southern  
Sudanese  govern- ments] into war and that  the government  of Southern  Sudan 
should be very careful with issue of the UPDF presence in the Sudan’’.132  
Residents  wondered  whether  it was really the president of Uganda, rather  than the 
Southern  Sudanese government, who had the last word on UPDF deployment  in 
Sudan.133 Such experiences fuelled the affected communities’ doubts  about  the 
strength  of the Southern  Sudanese government. 
A  side effect of  the  incident  with  the  UPDF convoy  accompanying   
journal- ists  and  diplomats  to  the  LRA  assembly  area  in  2006 was  that  after  
the  failed assembly - and with some fingers pointing  at the SPLA, which had not 
dispatched sufficient protection forces to the area in time - the SPLA presence in 
Magwi County increased  dramatically.  Owiny-Kibul  was turned  into  an  SPLA  
training  centre.  In April  2007, when reportedly  only remnants  of LRA  were left 
in the state,  Magwi County  Commissioner  Emilio Igga during  a meeting in 
Kapoeta outlined  his two major concerns about the situation  in his county. After 
the impasse in the Juba Talks between December  2006 and  April 2007, and  a surge 
of LRA violence in the state in  the  first  few  months   of  2007,  relations   within  
  
 
the  community   had  further deteriorated, as those who had supported the 
assembly as a way to bring peace were now accused  of destabilising  the  area.  But,  
he added,  the  suggested  solution  had made  things  even worse: as more  SPLA 
were deployed  in the area  to contain  the violence, the locals’ resentment  of the 
SPLA had  come to the fore, and  the SPLA treated locals with no respect. Abuses 
were regularly reported.  In fact, he concluded, the  SPLA  presence  created  more  
problems  than   it  solved  and  peace  remained elusive.134 
 
 
International  support and continued militarisation 
When in 2006, the LRA/M  and the Government of Uganda  gathered in Juba to 
start peace talks, the presence of international agencies and foreign governments 
was important for the LRA.  From  their  perspective,  the peace talks  gained  
legitimacy from the growing international acknowledgment that,  although  the 
LRA  had perpetrated  the  most  visible  and  brutal   atrocities,   the  UPDF had  
also  been  a perpetrator, herding people into camps, imposing structural violence 
on northern Ugandan  civilians,  and   committing   atrocities   against   civilians  in  
Uganda   and Sudan.135  For  the LRA/M, the hope  of the Juba  Talks  lay initially 
in reaching  an understanding that both sides had to be called to account in one 
way or another.  Yet as progress at the table remained slow and the LRA/M  was 
held responsible for the delays, UPDF atrocities  moved out of focus. Instead,  talk 
about  increasing military pressure on the LRA  to move the Juba  Talks to a 
conclusion,  grew louder. 
 
 
Calling for a military intervention 
Public  support  to  exert  military  leverage on  the  LRA  to  sign a peace  deal  came 
primarily from international organisations.136 Simultaneously,  US government 
representatives,  attending  the Juba  Talks as observers,  nurtured a military  
partner- ship with the UPDF that  had been existent since the 1990s. International 
observers to the Juba  Talks have cited this relationship as the second most 
damaging  element to the Juba Talks. US support  for the UPDF was already strong 
in the late 1990s and has steadily increased since 9/11. Having put the LRA on the 
terrorist  list earlier, the US declared Kony a ‘‘Specially Designated  Global  Terrorist’’ 
under Executive order 
13224 on August 28, 2008.137  The War on Terror had brought  the US and the 
UPDF even closer together,  with the UPDF deploying to fight Al-Shabbab and Al 
Qaeda in Somalia  and  with  the  terrorist   designation   paving  the  way  for  US  
intervention against the LRA. With Operation Lightning Thunder  billed as a 
humanitarian intervention citing human rights abuses committed  by the LRA - in 
line with current trends to base a military intervention on a rights framework  rather  
than a legal one, as Mamdani argues138 - citizens have been left exposed. Even 
Human  Rights Watch, a proponent of military pressure on the LRA, noted that 
the US-supported military intervention was a failure and had caused the spread of 
the LRA, putting civilians at risk: ‘‘The  current  strategy  of supporting  Ugandan 
army operations is clearly not working,’’ a press release stated.139 
As  low-key  military  engagement  by  the  Ugandan forces  continued   in  South 
  
 
Sudan, DRC  and the CAR from 2008 onward,  the call for vigorous US military 
engagement   became  a  constant   campaign   feature   of  a  range   of  
international advocacy groups. Invisible Children’s tremendously  successful March  
2012 video campaign  ‘‘Kony2012’’ was aimed solely at continuing  US support  to 
the Ugandan troops.  By March  15, the  viral  video  campaign  had  raised  an  
average  donation amount  of  US$23  million  from  the  1.7 million  visitors  to  the  
Invisible  Children donation page.140 Occasionally, local voices were heard. In a 
December 2010 letter to President  Obama,  34 civil society  organisations  from  
DRC,  CAR  and  Southern Sudan  urged an implementation of the LRA  strategy.  
This strategy  to support  the disarmament of the  LRA,  building  on  US  
legislation  that  had  been  passed  after intense lobbying from advocacy groups, had 
been announced by the White House on 24 November  2010.141   Reminding  the 
President  of the suffering and deaths  caused through  LRA attacks,  the appeal 
stressed the hardship  of life under displacement  - most of which, it must be 
noted,  had happened  since the military intervention. The main emphasis of the 
letter however was on the importance to provide civilian protection, which, they 
pointed  out,  the UN  was not providing. 
Human  Rights Watch argued for US military engagement on the basis that 
none of  the   local  national   armies   have  the   capacity   to   obliterate   the   
LRA.   The organisation  did  not   explicitly  dismiss  a  role  for   the   UPDF,  
despite   having documented  the  army’s  abuses  against  civilians for  years  and  
earlier  stating  that support   for  the  Ugandan  army  was  not  working.  The  
Guardian  described  the implication  that  the US should send troops  to Central  
Africa as 
 
distinctly chilling coming from the head of the world’s most influential human rights 
organisation. If it’s OK to send in a special forces hit squad to take out Kony,  why 
not also take out all the other, in some cases equally vicious, rebel groups in Central 
Africa? Why not,  even, put the whole continent  under  US military command?142 
 
Between December  2008 and  November  2010, the  US  provided  the  UPDF  
with logistical and intelligence support  worth  more than  US$23 million.143 
 
 
 
Regurgitating  fallacious strategies 
The implications  of continued  US support  for Ugandan military activities are grave: 
through    their   mutually   beneficial   relationship,  the   US   and   the   UPDF  
are maintaining   the  very methods,  alliances  and  military  action  that  have  a  
decade- long history  of failure  to  bring  peace to  the region,  but  have instead  
disastrously affected  civilians. Kaldor  argues  that  in situations  in which war  
actors  work  in a mutual enterprise, ‘‘international policy must aim to damp down 
violence rather than support  one side or another or even find a compromise 
between the sides.’’144 Instead incidents involving the UPDF in its fight against the 
LRA tended to be reported  as isolated  - loudly  rebuffed  by  the  UPDF, at  
times  pointing  out  its  international importance in the war on terror  - rather  
than  as a manifestation of how the UPDF functions.  The Ugandan army garnered  
international support,  despite the evidence that   the  UPDF’s  interpretation  and   
  
 
management  of  civilian-military  relations includes abuse and  resource  
exploitation. A prominent  example of this is the 2010 
UN report  on human rights abuses during the Congolese civil war, which 
implicated the UPDF as perpetrators of atrocities.145 The UPDF countered  any 
criticism of its actions  by threatening to withdraw  its support  for the Somalia 
mission.146 
US thinking  about  a military  strategy  and  about  the role of the UPDF 
stayed within   parameters  that   are   devastating   for  civilians  who  continue   to   
live  in increasingly militarised environments. In the White House strategy to support 
the disarmament of the LRA,  a broader  understanding of the militarised  
environment and the way this war had been fought was noticeably absent. The 
strategy speculates, ‘‘Any reduction  in military or diplomatic  pressure, or the 
provision  of safe haven by any  state  or  non-state   actor,  could  enable  the  LRA  
to  regroup  and  rebuild  its forces.’’147   In  reality,  the  LRA  had  been  managing   
for  more  than  20  years  to continually   rebuild  its  forces,  particularly   when  
under  military  pressure,  yet  its numbers  had  dwindled  by the  time  the  strategy  
was released.  Further down,  the strategy  spells  out  the  tragic  consequences  of  
the  US  assumption that  military pressure  is the only way to  contain  the LRA:  
‘‘The  LRA  has often  responded  to military pressure by retaliating  against 
vulnerable communities.’’148  Brutal massacres of  hundreds   of  civilians  in  DRC   
at  Christmas   2008,  committed   shortly   after Operation Lightning  Thunder  was 
launched  with no protection provisions  in place, prove this point.149 Yet the 
strategy  suggests no alternative  approach to resolving a crisis that had been 
ongoing for decades. Drawing  conclusions from an LRA expert meeting  Hemmer   
asks  ‘‘whether  a  continuation  of  current   military  activities  is acceptable   when  
the  safety  of  the  population  inhabiting   the  area   cannot   be guaranteed, 
particularly  given the extensive timeframe  and low success rate of these activities 
thus far’’.150 Although this question focuses on the viability of Operation Lightning 
Thunder,  it becomes even more pertinent  in relation  to the length of time the  
UPDF has  been  present  in Sudan  and  the  impact  this  presence  has  had  on 
civilians over many years. 
There was a certain  irony  in the comment  of UPDF spokesman  Lt Col. 
Felix Kulaigye who, responding  to the publication of the Obama  strategy  with its 
strong military emphasis, told the newspaper The East African ‘‘military action 
should have come way back in 2003 (at the peak of LRA brutality).  Many lives 
would have been saved in Sudan,  DR  Congo  and  Uganda.’’151  It  was unclear  
what  he thought  the UPDF had been doing in Sudan all these years. The 
comment might be simply distasteful,  yet  it  points  to  the  greater  problem  of  
how  perceptions,   beliefs and military power intersect to create civilian victims. The 
UPDF has for years been criticised for fighting  the LRA  as if it was fighting  a 
conventional  enemy. Having persistently  and  unsuccessfully  pursued  the  LRA  in 
Uganda  with  military  tactics more suited to frontline battle than to fighting an 
insurgency in difficult territory,  the UPDF then  exported  the same inappropriate 
tactics  to Sudan.152  While the LRA had existed successfully as a mobile force for 
decades, and had shown great creativity in  reinventing  itself  in  the  face  of  a  
string  of  armed  opponents through   forced recruitment, violence against civilians 
and shifting locations, conventional military thinking  had  been  dominated  by 
  
 
outdated notions  of war.  ‘‘For  an  operation to cripple  LRA’s  ability  to  make  
war,  it  must  establish  the  rebel  army’s  centre  of gravity,’’ the Ugandan newspaper  
The Independent quotes a UPDF general’s assessment of Operation Lightning  
Thunder. 
 
In military terms, a centre of gravity is that object which, when destroyed,  would 
bring other  elements of enemy strength  to  collapse  and  therefore  render  the  ability  
of the enemy to make war futile. In the case of the LRA,  the person  of Kony  is 
the central fulcrum around which the functioning of the LRA rotates; you kill him and 
LRA would collapse. In this case, Kony is to LRA what Jonas Savimbi was to UNITA 
in Angola.153 
 
Such thinking  prevailed, even when it became clear that the strength  of the LRA lay 
in independently  operating  small units  and  that  Kony’s  central  grip  on  his 
forces might have been weakened without  diminishing  the LRA’s lethal impact.154 
The UPDF’s continued  presence points to a larger issue as the failure to 
protect the  citizens of Eastern  Equatoria was also  the  international 
community’s:  UPDF abuses  had  been reported  in Uganda  for years. Sudan’s  and  
Uganda’s  inability  to protect  their  own  citizens was  seemingly  not  taken  into  
account,  and  all  of  the regional governments involved - Kampala, Khartoum and 
later Juba - failed to take decisive  action   against   this  militarisation  by  a  foreign  
government’s  army.  US military support  prevailed. 
 
 
Conclu
sion 
Being caught  between  several armed  groups  has  been  devastating  for  civilians in 
South Sudan. However, hostilities by the LRA and the UPDF have been 
particularly confusing for local residents: it was unclear why a foreign rebel group 
turned against Sudanese  civilians,  and  even  less comprehensible   how  a  foreign  
state  force  was seemingly allowed to do the same. The continuing  disregard  and 
outright  abuse of civilians  by  a  foreign  army,  with  none  of  the  benefits  of  an  
end  to  the  rebel insurgency they have come to fight, poses broad questions about  
the damaging effect of the recycling of military beliefs and methods.  In light of the 
fact that  the UPDF has  been  able  to  act  for  long  stretches  of  time  with  US  
support,   international conventions  regarding  civilian protection cannot  be simply 
dismissed and abuses by the  UPDF cannot  be seen as accidents.  Rather, they  
show  that  atrocities  against civilians and  lack of transparency are part  of how  
the  UPDF functions.  Further, international actors,  namely the US, do not  
prioritise  addressing  these issues. In a complex conflict situation,  bringing in yet 
another  force with little control over its behaviour  merely entrenches  the  conflict  
and  exposes civilians, as this  case study shows. This is, however, a lesson that 
remains to be learned in international thinking about  seemingly localised conflicts, 
particularly  those that  draw huge, if superficial, international  interest  through   
advocacy  campaigns.   In  the  meantime,   life  in  a peaceful environment  remains 
elusive for civilians. 
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